



The word ‘cosmopolitan’, which derives from the Greek word NRVPRSROLWrV (‘citizen of the 
world’), has been used to describe a wide variety of important views in moral and socio-
political philosophy. The nebulous core shared by all cosmopolitan views is the idea that all 
human beings, regardless of their political affiliation, do (or at least can) belong to a single 
community, and that this community should be cultivated. Different versions of 
cosmopolitanism envision this community in different ways, some focusing on political 
institutions, others on moral norms or relationships, and still others focusing on shared 
markets or forms of cultural expression. The philosophical interest in cosmopolitanism lies in 
its challenge to commonly recognized attachments to fellow-citizens, the local state, 
parochially shared cultures, and the like. 
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The political culture that is idealized in the writings of Plato and Aristotle is not 
cosmopolitan. In this culture, a man identifies himself first and foremost as a citizen of a 
particular polis or city, and in doing so, he signals which institutions and which body of 
people hold his allegiance. He would then be counted on for help in defending the city from 
attacks, sustaining its institutions of justice, and contributing to its common good. In this way, 
his own pursuit of a good life is inextricably bound to the fate of the city and to the similar 
pursuit carried out by other inhabitants of the city. By contrast, the good person would not be 
expected to share with or serve any foreigners who live outside the city. Any cosmopolitan 
expectations on a good Athenian extended only to concern for those foreigners who happen to 
reside in Athens. 
It would, however, be wrong to assume that Classical Greek thought was uniformly DQWL
FRVPRSROLWDQ. Actively excluding foreigners from any ethical consideration or actively 
targeting foreigners for heinous treatment goes one step beyond focusing one's service and 
concern on compatriots, and in fact, the targeting of ‘barbarians’ is historically linked with the 
rise of panhellenism and not with the more narrow emphasis on the polis. It would be more 
accurate to call the Classical emphasis on the polis XQFRVPRSROLWDQ. 
Yet even as Plato and Aristotle were writing, other Greeks were issuing cosmopolitan 
challenges. Perhaps the most obvious challenges came from the traveling intellectuals who 
insisted on the contrast between the conventional ties of politics and the natural ties of 
humanity. Notice, for example, the way Plato has the Sophist Hippias address the motley crew 
of Athenians and foreigners present at Callias’ house in Plato’s 3URWDJRUDV (337c7-d3): 
Gentlemen present ... I regard you all as kinsmen, familiars, and fellow-citizens -- by nature 
and not by convention; for like is by nature akin to like, while convention, which is a tyrant 
over human beings, forces many things contrary to nature. 
Socrates, too, it can be argued, was sensitive to this more cosmopolitan identification with 
human beings as such. At least as Plato characterizes him, Socrates avoids traditional political 
engagement as much as he can, in favor of an extraordinary career of examining himself and 
others, and he insists that these examinations are both genuinely political (*RUJ 521d6-8) and 
extended to all, Athenians and foreigners alike ($SRO 23b4-6). Of course, Socrates chose not 
to travel widely, but this decision could well have been consistent with cosmopolitan ideals, 
for he may have thought that his best bet for serving human beings generally lay in staying at 
home, on account, ironically, of Athens’ superior freedom of speech (*RUJ 461e1-3; cf. $SRO 
37c5-e2 and 0HQR 80b4-7). Whether Socrates was self-consciously cosmopolitan in this way 
or not, there is no doubt that his ideas accelerated the development of cosmopolitanism and 
that he was in later antiquity embraced as a citizen of the world. In fact, the first philosopher 
in the West to give perfectly explicit expression to cosmopolitanism was the Socratically 
inspired Cynic Diogenes in the fourth century bce. It is said that “when he was asked where 
he came from, he replied, ‘I am a citizen of the world [NRVPRSROLWrV]’ ” (Diogenes Laertius VI 
63). By identifying himself not as a citizen of Sinope but as a citizen of the world, Diogenes 
was refusing to agree that he owed special service to Sinope and the Sinopeans. So 
understood, ‘I am a citizen of the cosmos’  is a negative claim, and we might wonder if there is 
any positive content to the Cynic's world-citizenship. The most natural suggestion would be 
that a world-citizen should serve the world-state, helping to bring it about in order to enable 
the later work of sustaining its institutions and contributing to its common good. But the 
historical record does not suggest that Diogenes the Cynic favored the introduction of a 
world-state. In fact, the historical record does not unambiguously provide Diogenes any 
positive commitments that we can readily understand as cosmopolitan. The best we can do to 
find positive cosmopolitanism in Diogenes is to insist that the whole Cynic way of life is 
supposed to be cosmopolitan: by living in accordance with nature and rejecting what is 
conventional, the Cynic sets an example of high-minded virtue to all other human beings.  
A fuller exploration of positively committed philosophical cosmopolitanism arrives only with 
the Socratizing and Cynic-influenced Stoics of the third century ce. These Stoics are fond of 
saying that the cosmos is, as it were, a polis, because the cosmos is put in perfect order by 
law, which is divine reason. They also embrace the negative implication of their high 
standards for order and law: conventional polises do not, strictly speaking, deserve the name. 
But the Stoics do not believe that living in agreement with the cosmos -- as a citizen of the 
cosmos -- requires maintaining critical distance from conventional polises. Rather, as the 
traces of Chrysippus' 2Q/LYHV make clear, the Stoics believe that goodness requires serving 
other human beings as best one can given the circumstances, that serving all human beings 
equally well is impossible, and that the best service one can give typically requires political 
engagement. Of course, the Stoics recognize that political engagement will not be possible for 
everyone, and that some people will best be able to help other human beings as private 
teachers of virtue rather than as politicians. But in no case, the Stoics insist, is consideration 
of political engagement to be limited to one's own polis. The motivating idea is, after all, to 
help human beings as such, and sometimes the best way to do that is to serve as a teacher or 
as a political advisor in some foreign place. In this fashion, the Stoics introduce clear, 
practical content to their metaphor of the cosmopolis: a cosmopolitan considers moving away 
in order to serve, whereas a non-cosmopolitan does not. 
This content admits of a strict and a more moderate interpretation. On the strict view, when 
one considers whether to emigrate, one recognizes prima facie no special or stronger reason to 
serve compatriots than to serve a set of human beings abroad. On the moderate view, one does 
introduce into one’s deliberations extra reason to serve compatriots, although one might still, 
all things considered, make the best choice by emigrating. The evidence does not permit a 
decisive attribution of one or the other of these interpretations to any of the earliest Stoics. But 
if we think of a Stoic like Chrysippus as deeply attracted to the Cynics’ rejection of what is 
merely conventional, then we will find it easy to think of Chrysippus as a strict cosmopolitan. 
Things are a bit different for at least some of the Stoics at Rome. On the one hand, the 
cosmopolis becomes less demanding. Whereas Chrysippus limits citizenship in the cosmos to 
those who in fact live in agreement with the cosmos and its law, Roman Stoics extend 
citizenship to all human beings by virtue of their rationality. On the other hand, local 
citizenship becomes more demanding. There is no doubt that the Stoicism of Cicero’s 'H
2IILFLLV or of Seneca’s varied corpus explicitly acknowledges obligations to the SDWULD. This is 
a moderate Stoic cosmopolitanism, and empire made the doctrine very easy for many Romans 
by identifying the Roman patria with the cosmopolis itself. But neither imperialism nor a 
literal interpretation of world-citizenship is required for the philosophical point. The 
maximally committed cosmopolitan looks around to determine whom he can best help and 
how, knowing full well that he cannot help all people in just the same way, and his decision to 
help some people far more than others is justified by cosmopolitan lights if it is the best he 
can do to help human beings as such. 
Stoic cosmopolitanism in its various guises was enormously persuasive throughout the Greco-
Roman world. In part, this success can be explained by noting how cosmopolitan the world at 
that time was. Alexander the Great’s conquests and the subsequent division of his empire into 
successor kingdoms sapped local cities of much of their traditional authority and fostered 
increased contacts between cities, and later, the rise of the Roman Empire united the whole of 
the Mediterranean under one political power. But it is wrong to say what has frequently been 
said, that cosmopolitanism arose as a UHVSRQVH to the fall of the polis or to the rise of the 
Roman empire. First, the polis’ fall has been greatly exaggerated. Under the successor 
kingdoms and even -- though to a lesser degree -- under Rome, there remained substantial 
room for important political engagement locally. Second, and more decisively, the 
cosmopolitanism that was so persuasive during the so-called Hellenistic Age and under the 
Roman Empire was in fact rooted in intellectual developments that SUHGDWH Alexander’s 
conquests. Still, there is no doubting that the empires under which Stoicism developed and 
flourished made many people more receptive to the cosmopolitan ideal and thus contributed 
greatly to the widespread influence of Stoic cosmopolitanism. 
Nowhere was Stoic cosmopolitanism itself more influential than in early Christianity. Early 
Christians took the later Stoic recognition of two cities as independent sources of obligation 
and added a twist. For the Stoics, the work of the polis and its citizens and the work of the 
cosmopolis and its citizens are the same: both aim to improve the lives of the citizens. The 
Christians respond to a different call: “Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are 
Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's” (Matthew 22:21). On this view, the local 
city may have divine authority (-RKQ 19:11; cf. 5RPDQV 13:1,4,7), but the most important 
work for human goodness is removed from traditional politics, set aside in a sphere in which 
people of all nations can become “fellow-citizens with the saints” ((SKHVLDQV 2:20). 
This development has two important and long-lasting consequences, which are canonized by 
Augustine. First, the cosmopolis again becomes a community for certain people only. 
Augustine makes this point most explicitly by limiting the citizenship in the city of God to 
those who love God. All others are relegated to the inferior -- though still universal -- earthly 
city by their love of self. These two cities of the world, which are doomed to coexist 
intertwined until the Final Judgment, divide the world's inhabitants. Second, the work of 
politics is severed from the task of building good human lives, lives of righteousness and 
justice. While Augustine can stress that this allows citizens in the city of God to obey local 
laws concerning “the necessaries for the maintenance of life,” he must also acknowledge that 
it sets up a potential conflict over the laws of religion and the concerns of righteousness and 
justice (e.g., &LYLWDV'HL XIX 17). 
For hundreds of years to come, debates in political philosophy would surround the relation 
between ‘temporal’  political authority and the ‘universal Church.’  But emphasis on the 
cosmopolitan aspect of the Church waned, despite its ideal of a religious community 
comprising all humans. In a nutshell, the debate now opposed the secular and the religious, 
and not the local and the cosmopolitan. Though cosmopolitanism might have featured 
prominently in medieval political thought, it did not.  
  
(DUO\0RGHUQDQG(QOLJKWHQPHQW&RVPRSROLWDQLVP
Cosmopolitanism slowly began to come to the fore again with the renewed study of more 
ancient texts, but during the humanist era cosmopolitanism still remained the exception. 
Despite the fact that ancient cosmopolitan sources were well-known and that many humanists 
emphasized the essential unity of all religions, they did not develop this idea in cosmopolitan 
terms. A few authors, however, most notably Erasmus of Rotterdam, explicitly drew on 
ancient cosmopolitanism to advocate the ideal of a world-wide peace. Emphasizing the unity 
of humankind over its division into different states and peoples, by arguing that humans are 
destined by Nature to be sociable and live in harmony, Erasmus pleaded for national and 
religious tolerance and regarded like-minded people as his compatriots (4XHUHOD3DFLV). 
Early modern natural law theory might seem a likely candidate for spawning philosophical 
cosmopolitanism. Its secularizing tendencies and the widespread individualist view among its 
defenders that all humans share certain fundamental characteristics would seem to suggest a 
point of unification for humankind as a whole. However, according to many early modern 
theorists, what all individuals share is a fundamental striving for self-preservation, and the 
universality of this striving does not amount to a fundamental bond that unites (or should 
unite) all humans in a universal community. 
Still, there are two factors that do sometimes push modern natural law theory in a 
cosmopolitan direction: first, the fact that some natural law theorists assume that nature 
implanted in humans, in addition to the tendency to self-preservation, DOVR a fellow-feeling, a 
form of sociability that unites all humans at a fundamental level into a kind of world 
community. The appeal to such a shared human bond was very thin, however, and by no 
means does it necessarily lead to cosmopolitanism. In fact, the very notion of a natural 
sociability was sometimes used instead to legitimate war against peoples elsewhere in the 
world who were said to have violated this common bond in an ‘unnatural’  way, or who were 
easily said to have placed themselves outside of the domain of common human morality by 
their ‘barbaric’  customs. Second, early modern natural law theory was often connected with 
social contract theory, and although most social contract theorists worked out their views 
mostly, if not solely, for the level of the state and not for that of international relations, the 
very idea behind social contract theory lends itself for application to this second level. 
Grotius, Pufendorf, and others did draw out these implications and thereby laid the foundation 
for international law. Grotius envisioned a “ great society of states”  that is bound by a “ law of 
nations”  that holds “ between all states”  ('H,XUH%HOOLDF3DFL, 1625, Prolegomena par. 17; 
Pufendorf, 'H,XUH1DWXUDHHW*HQWLXP, 1672). 
The historical context of the philosophical resurgence of cosmopolitanism during the 
Enlightenment is made up of many factors: The increasing rise of capitalism and world-wide 
trade and its theoretical reflections; the reality of ever expanding empires whose reach 
extended across the globe; the voyages around the world and the anthropological so-called 
‘discoveries’  facilitated through these; the renewed interest in Hellenistic philosophy; and the 
emergence of a notion of human rights and a philosophical focus on human reason. Many 
intellectuals of the time regarded their membership in the transnational ‘republic of letters’  as 
more significant than their membership in the particular political states they found themselves 
in, all the more so because their relationship with their government was often strained because 
of censorship issues. This prepared them to think in terms other than those of states and 
peoples and adopt a cosmopolitan perspective. Under the influence of the American 
Revolution, and especially during the first years of the French Revolution, cosmopolitanism 
received its strongest impulse. The 1789 declaration of ‘human’  rights had grown out of 
cosmopolitan modes of thinking and reinforced them in turn. 
In the eighteenth century, the terms ‘cosmopolitanism’  and ‘world citizenship’  were often 
used not as labels for determinate philosophical theories, but rather to indicate an attitude of 
open-mindedness and impartiality. A cosmopolitan was someone who was not subservient to 
a particular religious or political authority, someone who was not biased by particular 
loyalties or cultural prejudice. Furthermore, the term was sometimes used to indicate a person 
who led an urbane life-style, or who was fond of traveling, cherished a network of 
international contacts, or felt at home everywhere. In this sense the Encyclopédie mentioned 
that ‘cosmopolitan’  was often used to signify a “ man of no fixed abode, or a man who is 
nowhere a stranger.”  Though philosophical authors such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot, 
Addison, Hume, and Jefferson identified themselves as cosmopolitans in one or more of these 
senses, these usages are not of much philosophical interest. 
Especially in the second half of the century, however, the term was increasingly also used to 
indicate particular philosophical convictions. Some authors revived the Cynic tradition. 
Fougeret de Montbron in his 1753 autobiographical report, /H&RVPRSROLWH, calls himself a 
cosmopolitan, describes how he travels everywhere without being committed to anywhere, 
declaring “ All the countries are the same to me”  and “ [I am] changing my places of residence 
according to my whim”  (p. 130). 
Despite the fact that there were only few authors who committed themselves to this kind of 
cosmopolitanism, this was the version that critics of cosmopolitanism took as their target. For 
example, Rousseau complains that cosmopolitans “ boast that they love everyone [WRXWOH
PRQGH, which also means ‘the whole world’ ], to have the right to love no one”  (Geneva 
Manuscript version of 7KH6RFLDO&RQWUDFW 158). Johann Georg Schlosser, in the critical 
poem ‘Der Kosmopolit’  writes, “ It is better to be proud of one's nation than to have none,”  
obviously assuming that cosmopolitanism implies the latter. 
Yet most eighteenth-century defenders of cosmopolitanism did not recognize their own view 
in these critical descriptions. They understood cosmopolitanism not as a form of ultra-
individualism, but rather, drawing on the Stoic tradition, as implying the positive moral ideal 
of a universal human community, and they did not regard this ideal as inimical to more 
particular attachments such as patriotism. Some, like the German author Christoph Martin 
Wieland, stayed quite close to Stoic views. Others developed a cosmopolitan moral theory 
that was distinctively new. According to Kant, all rational beings are members in a single 
moral community. They are analogous to citizens in the political (republican) sense in that 
they share the characteristics of freedom, equality, and independence, and that they give 
themselves the law. Their common laws, however, are the laws of morality, grounded in 
reason. Early utilitarian cosmopolitans like Jeremy Bentham, by contrast, defended their 
cosmopolitanism by pointing to the “ common and equal utility of all nations.”  Moral 
cosmopolitanism could be grounded in human reason, or in some other characteristic 
universally shared among humans (and in some cases other kinds of beings) such as the 
capacity to experience pleasure or pain, a moral sense, or the aesthetic imagination. Moral 
cosmopolitans regarded all humans as ‘brothers’  (though with obvious gender bias) -- an 
analogy with which they aimed to indicate the fundamental equality of rank of all humans, 
which precluded slavery, colonial exploitation, feudal hierarchy, and tutelage of various sorts. 
Some cosmopolitans developed their view into a political theory about international relations. 
The most radical of eighteenth-century political cosmopolitans was no doubt Anarcharsis 
Cloots (Jean-Baptiste du Val-de-Grace, baron de Cloots, 1755-1794). Cloots advocated the 
abolition of all existing states and the establishment of a single world state under which all 
human individuals would be directly subsumed. His arguments drew first of all on the general 
structure of social contract theory. If it is in the general interest for everyone to submit to the 
authority of a state that enforces laws that provide security, then this argument applies world-
wide and justifies the establishment of a world-wide “ republic of united individuals,”  not a 
plurality of states that find themselves in the state of nature vis-à-vis each other. Second, he 
argues that sovereignty should reside with the people, and that the concept of sovereignty 
itself, because it involves indivisibility, implies that there can be but one sovereign body in 
the world, namely, the human race as a whole (/DUpSXEOLTXHXQLYHUVHOOHRXDGUHVVHDX[
W\UDQQLFLGHV 1792; %DVHVFRQVWLWXWLRQHOOHVGHODUpSXEOLTXHGXJHQUHKXPDLQ 1793). 
Most other political cosmopolitans did not go as far as Cloots. Immanuel Kant, most 
famously, advocated a much weaker form of international legal order, namely, that of a 
‘league of nations.’  In 3HUSHWXDO3HDFH (1795) Kant argues that true and world-wide peace is 
possible only when states are organized internally according to ‘republican’  principles, when 
they are organized externally in a voluntary league for the sake of keeping peace, and when 
they respect the human rights not only of their citizens but also of foreigners. He argues that 
the league of states should not have coercive military powers because that would violate the 
internal sovereignty of states, constitute a potential danger to individual freedoms already 
established within those states (if the federal authority were less respectful of human rights 
than some of the member states) and reduce the chances that states would actually join. 
Some critics argued in response that Kant's position was inconsistent, on the grounds that the 
only way to fully overcome the state of nature among states was for them to enter into a 
federative unity of states with coercive powers. They transformed the concept of sovereignty 
in the process, by conceiving it as layered, and this enabled them to argue that states ought to 
transfer part of their sovereignty to the federal level, but only that part that concerns their 
external relations to other states, while retaining the sovereignty of the states concerning their 
internal affairs (the early Fichte). Romantic authors, on the other hand, felt that the ideal state 
should not have to involve coercion at all, and hence also that the cosmopolitan ideal should 
be that of a world-wide republic of ‘fraternal’  non-authoritarian republics (the young 
Friedrich Schlegel). 
Kant also introduced the concept of "cosmopolitan law," suggesting a third sphere of public 
law -- in addition to constitutional law and international law -- in which both states and 
individuals have rights, and where individuals have these rights as "citizens of the earth" 
rather than as citizens of particular states. 
In addition to moral and political forms of cosmopolitanism, there emerged an economic form 
of cosmopolitan theory. The freer trade advocated by eighteenth-century anti-mercantilists 
like Adam Smith and Dietrich Hermann Hegewisch took greater and greater hold. They 
sought to diminish the role of politics in the economic realm. Their ideal was a world in 
which tariffs and other restrictions on foreign trade are abolished, a world in which the 
market, not the government, takes care of the needs of the people. Against mercantilism, they 
argue that it is more advantageous for everyone involved if a nation imports those goods 
which are more expensive to produce domestically, and that the assumption that one's own 
state will profit if other states are unable to export their goods is false. They argue that the 
situation is quite the contrary: the abolition of protectionism would benefit everyone, because 
other states would gain from their exports, reach a higher standard of living and then become 
even better trading partners, because they could then import more, too. On their view, after 
trade will have been liberalized world-wide, the importance of national governments will 
diminish dramatically. As national governments currently focus on the national economy and 
defense, their future role will be at most auxiliary. In the ideal global market, war is in no 
one's interest. The freer the global market becomes, the more the role of the states will 
become negligible.  
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Enlightenment cosmopolitanism has continued to be a source of debate in the subsequent two 
centuries. First, in the nineteenth century, economic globalization provoked fierce reactions. 
Marx and Engels tagged cosmopolitanism as an ideological reflection of capitalism. They 
regard market capitalism as inherently expansive, breaking the bounds of the nation-state 
system, as evidenced by the fact that production and consumption had become attuned to 
faraway lands. In their hands, the word ’ cosmopolitan’  is tied to the effects of capitalist 
globalization, including especially the bourgeois ideology which legitimatizes ‘free’  trade in 
terms of the freedom of individuals and mutual benefit, although this very capitalist order is 
the cause of the misery of millions, indeed the cause of the very existence of the proletariat. 
At the same time, however, Marx and Engels also hold that the proletariat in every country 
shares essential features and has common interests, and the Communist movement aims to 
convince proletarians everywhere of these common interests. Most famously, the &RPPXQLVW
0DQLIHVWR ends with the call, “ Proletarians of all countries, unite!”  This, combined with the 
ideal of the class-less society and the expected withering away of the state after the 
revolution, implies a form of cosmopolitanism of its own. 
Debates about global capitalism and about an international workers’ movement have persisted. 
Frequently economic cosmopolitanism can be found in the advocacy of open markets, in the 
tradition from Adam Smith to Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman. Communist 
versions of cosmopolitanism also developed further, although the Leninist-Stalinist tradition 
kept using ‘cosmopolitan’  itself as a derogatory term. 
The second inheritance from eighteenth century cosmopolitanism is found in the two 
centuries' worth of attempts to create peace. It has often been noted that there are parallels 
between Kant's peace proposal in 3HUSHWXDO3HDFH and the structure of the League of Nations 
as it existed in the early part of the 20th century as well as the structure of the current United 
Nations, although it should also be pointed out that essential features of Kant's plan were not 
implemented, such as the abolition of standing armies. Now, after the end of the cold war, 
there is again a resurgence of the discussion about the most appropriate world order to 
promote peace, just as there was after the first and second world wars. 
The International Criminal Court should be mentioned here as an innovative form of 
cosmopolitanism, going much beyond Kant's conception of ‘cosmopolitan law.’  The ICC 
itself represents an extension of the long trend, in international law, to do away with the 
principle of the absolute subjection of individuals to the state and develop the status of 
individuals under international law. Individuals are now the bearers of certain rights under 
international law, and they can be held responsible for crimes under international law in ways 
that cut through the shield of state sovereignty. 
Third, moral philosophers and moralists in the wake of eighteenth-century cosmopolitanisms 
have insisted that we human beings have a duty to aid fellow humans in need, regardless of 
their citizenship status. There is a history of international relief efforts (International Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies, famine relief organizations, and the like) in the name of the 
reduction of human suffering and without regard to the nationality of those affected. 
Cosmopolitan duty is not restricted to duties of beneficence and also requires justice and 
respect, and cosmopolitan morality has often been invoked as a motivation to oppose slavery 
and apartheid, and to defend the emancipation of women, or, in the utilitarian tradition, to 
demand better treatment of animals. 
Most past cosmopolitan authors did not fully live up to the literal interpretation of their 
cosmopolitan theories, and one can find misogynist, racist, nationalist, religious, or class-
based biases and inconsistencies in their accounts. These shortcomings have often been used 
as arguments against cosmopolitanism, but they are not as easily used for that purpose as it 
may seem. Because the universalist potential in the discourse of ‘world citizenship’  can itself 
be used as a basis for exposing these shortcomings as problematic, one should say that they 
stem from too little, rather than too much, cosmopolitanism. 
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Even this brief glance backwards reveals a wide variety of views that can be called 
cosmopolitan. Every cosmopolitan argues for some community among all human beings, 
regardless of social and political affiliation. For some, what should be shared is simply moral 
community, which means only that living a good human life requires serving the universal 
community by helping human beings as such, and/or by promoting the realization of justice 
and the guarantee of human rights. Others conceptualize the universal community in terms of 
political institutions to be shared by all, in terms of cultural expressions to be appreciated by 
all, or in terms of economic markets that should be open to all.  
The most common cosmopolitanism -- PRUDO cosmopolitanism -- does not always call itself 
such. But just as ancient cosmopolitanism was fundamentally a ‘moral’  commitment to 
helping human beings as such, much contemporary moral philosophy insists on the duty to 
aid foreigners who are starving or otherwise suffering, and/or on the duty to respect and 
promote basic human rights and justice.  One can here distinguish between strict and 
moderate forms of cosmopolitanism. The VWULFW cosmopolitans in this sphere operate 
sometimes from utilitarian assumptions (e.g., Singer, Unger), sometimes from Kantian 
assumptions (e.g., O'Neill), and sometimes from more ancient assumptions (e.g., Nussbaum), 
but always with the claim that the duty to provide aid neither gets weighed against any extra 
duty to help locals or compatriots nor increases in strength when locals or compatriots are in 
question. Among these strict cosmopolitans some will say that it is permissible, at least in 
some situations, to concentrate one's charitable efforts on one's compatriots, while others deny 
this -- their position will depend on the details of their moral theory. Other philosophers 
whom we may call PRGHUDWH cosmopolitans (including, e.g., Scheffler) acknowledge the 
cosmopolitan scope of a duty to provide aid, but insist that we also have special duties to 
compatriots. Among the moderate cosmopolitans, many further distinctions can be drawn, 
depending on the reasons that are admitted for recognizing special responsibilities to 
compatriots and depending on how the special responsibilities are balanced with the 
cosmopolitan duties to human beings generally. $QWLFRVPRSROLWDQLVP in the moral sphere 
best describes the position of those communitarians (e.g., MacIntyre) who believe either that 
our obligations to compatriots and more local people crowd out any obligations to benefit 
human beings as such or that there are no obligations except where there are close, communal 
relationships. 
This debate about moral cosmopolitanism has sometimes led to an inquiry into SROLWLFDO 
cosmopolitanism. Again, we can draw useful distinctions among the political cosmopolitans. 
Some advocate a centralized world state, some favor a federal system with a comprehensive 
global body of limited power, some would prefer more limited international political 
institutions that focus on particular concerns (e.g., war crimes, environmental preservation), 
and some defend a different alternative altogether. Prominent philosophical discussions of 
international political arrangements have recently clustered around the self-conscious heirs of 
Kant (e.g., Habermas, Rawls, Beitz, and Pogge) and around advocates of ‘cosmopolitan 
democracy’  (e.g., Held, Bohman). Again, there are anti-cosmopolitans, who are skeptical of 
all international political entanglements. 
Perhaps the most common invocations of the label ‘cosmopolitan’  in recent philosophical 
literature have been in the disputes over FXOWXUDO cosmopolitanism. Especially with disputes 
over multiculturalism in educational curricula and with resurgent nationalisms, cultural claims 
and counter-claims have received much attention. The cosmopolitan position in both of these 
kinds of disputes rejects exclusive attachments to parochial culture. So on the one hand, the 
cosmopolitan encourages cultural diversity and appreciates a multicultural mélange, and on 
the other hand, the cosmopolitan rejects a strong nationalism. In staking out these claims, the 
cosmopolitan must be wary about very strong ‘rights to culture,’  respecting the rights of 
minority cultures while rebuffing the right to unconditional national self-determination. 
Hence, recent advocates of ‘liberal nationalism’  (e.g., Margalit and Raz, Tamir) or of the 
rights of minority cultures (e.g., Kymlicka) generally seem to be anti-cosmopolitan. But the 
cosmopolitan's wariness towards very strong rights to culture and towards national self-
determination need not be grounded in a wholesale skepticism about the importance of 
parochial cultural attachments. Cosmopolitanism can acknowledge the importance of (at least 
some kinds of) cultural attachments for the good human life (at least within certain limits), 
while denying that this implies that a person’s cultural identity should be defined by any 
bounded or homogeneous subset of the cultural resources available in the world (e.g., 
Waldron). 
(FRQRPLF cosmopolitanism is perhaps less often defended among philosophers and more 
often among economists (e.g., Hayek, Friedman) and certain politicians, especially in the 
richer countries of this world. It is the view that one ought to cultivate a single global 
economic market with free trade and minimal political involvement. It tends to be criticized 
rather than advanced by philosophical cosmopolitans, as many of them regard it as at least a 
partial cause of the problem of vast international economic inequality. These debates about 
the desirability of a fully globalized market have intensified in recent years, as a result of the 
end of the Cold War and the increasing reach of the market economy. 
2EMHFWLRQVWR&RVPRSROLWDQLVP
One of the most common objections to cosmopolitanism attacks a position that is in fact made 
of straw. Often it is said that cosmopolitanism is meaningless without the context of a world-
state or that cosmopolitanism necessarily involves the commitment to a world state. These 
claims are historically uninformed, because cosmopolitanism as a concept arose in the first 
instance as a metaphor for a way of life and not in literal guise. Ever since, there have been 
cosmopolitans who do not touch on the issue of international political organization, and of 
those who do, very few defend the ideal of a world state. Furthermore, even those 
cosmopolitans who do favor a world-state tend to support something more sophisticated that 
cannot be dismissed out of hand: a thin conception of world government with layered 
sovereignty.  
The more serious and philosophically interesting challenges to cosmopolitanism come in two 
main forms. The first calls into question the possibility of realizing the cosmopolitan ideal, 
while the second queries its desirability. We discuss these two challenges to the different 
forms of cosmopolitanism in turn. 
3ROLWLFDOFRVPRSROLWDQLVP
It is often argued that it is impossible to change the current nation-state system and to form a 
world-state or a global federation of states. This claim is hard to maintain, however, in the 
face of the existence of the United Nations, the existence of states with more than a billion 
people of heterogeneous backgrounds, and the experience with the USA and the EU. So in 
order to be taken seriously, the objection must instead be that it is impossible to form a JRRG 
state or federation of that magnitude, i.e., that it is impossible to realize or even approximate 
the cosmopolitan ideal in a way that makes it worth pursuing and that does not carry 
prohibitive risks. Here political cosmopolitans disagree among themselves. On one end of the 
spectrum we find those who argue in favor of a strong world-state, on the other end we find 
the defenders of a loose and voluntary federation, or a different system altogether.  
The defenders of the loose, voluntary and noncoercive federation warn that a world state 
easily becomes despotic without there being any competing power left to break the hold of 
despotism, and the defenders of the world-state reply that a stronger form of federation, or 
even merger, is the only way to truly exit the state of nature between states. Other authors 
have argued that the focus among many political cosmopolitans on only these two alternatives 
overlooks a third, and that a concern for human rights should lead one to focus instead on 
institutional reform that disperses sovereignty vertically, rather than concentrating it in all-
encompassing international institutions. On this view, peace, democracy, prosperity, and the 
environment would be better served by a system in which the political allegiance and loyalties 
of persons are widely dispersed over a number of political units of various sizes, without any 
one unit being dominant and thus occupying the traditional role of the state (Pogge). 
Of the objections brought up by non- or anticosmopolitans, two deserve special mention. 
First, some authors argue that the (partial or whole) surrender of state sovereignty required by 
the cosmopolitan scheme is an undue violation of the principle of the autonomy of states or 
the principle of democratic self-determination of their citizens. Second, so-called ‘realists’  
argue that states are in a Hobbesian state of nature as far as the relations among them are 
concerned, and that it is as inappropriate as it is futile to subject states to normative 
constraints. To these objections cosmopolitans have various kinds of response, ranging from 
developing their alternative normative theory (e.g., by arguing that global democracy 
increases rather than diminishes the democratic control of individual world citizens) to 
pointing out, as has been done at least since Grotius, that states have good reasons even on 
Hobbesian grounds to submit to certain forms of international legal arrangements. 
(FRQRPLFFRVPRSROLWDQLVP
Various arguments have been used to show that economic cosmopolitanism is not a viable 
option. Marx and later Marxists have argued that capitalism is self-destructive in the long run, 
because the exploitation, alienation, and poverty that it inflicts on the proletariat will provoke 
a world-wide revolution that will bring about the end of capitalism. In the twentieth century, 
when nationalist tendencies proved to be stronger (or in any case more easily mobilized) than 
international solidarity, and when the position of workers was strengthened to the point of 
making them unwilling to risk a revolution, this forced the left to reconsider this view.  
Critics of the economic cosmopolitan ideal have also started to emphasize another way in 
which capitalism bears the seeds of its own destruction within itself, namely, insofar as it is 
said to lead to a global environmental disaster that might spell the end of the human species, 
or in any event the end of capitalism as we know it. The effects of excessive consumption (in 
some parts of the world) and the exploitation of nature would make the earth inhospitable to 
future human generations. 
Even if one does not think that these first two problems are so serious as to make economic 
cosmopolitanism unviable, they can still make it seem XQGHVLUDEOH in the eyes of those who 
are concerned with poverty and environmental destruction. 
Moreover, there are several other concerns that lead critics to regard economic 
cosmopolitanism as undesirable. First among these is the lack of effective democratic control 
by the vast majority of the world's population, as large multinationals are able to impose 
demands on states that are in a weak economic position and their populations, demands that 
they cannot reasonably refuse to meet, although this does not mean that they meet them fully 
voluntarily. This concerns, for example, labor conditions or the use of raw materials in so-
called Third World countries. 
Second, economic cosmopolitans are accused of failing to pay attention to a number of 
probable side-effects of a global free market. In particular, they are criticized for neglecting or 
downplaying issues such as (a) the presupposition of large-scale migration or re-schooling 
when jobs disappear in one area (the loss of ties to friends and family, language, culture, etc., 
and the monetary costs of moving or re-tooling), (b) the lack of a guarantee that there will be 
a sufficient supply of living-wage jobs for all world citizens (especially given increasing 
automation), and (c) the problem of the detrimental effects of income disparities. They are 
similarly accused of failing to take seriously the fact that there might be circumstances under 
which it would be profitable for some states to be protectionist or wage war, such as wars 
about markets or raw materials and energy (e.g., oil). 
0RUDOFRVPRSROLWDQLVP
Another version of the criticism that cosmopolitanism is impossible targets the psychological 
assumptions of moral cosmopolitanism. Here it is said that human beings must have stronger 
attachments toward members of their own state or nation, and that attempts to disperse 
attachments to fellow-citizens in order to honor a moral community with human beings as 
such will cripple our sensibilities. If this is a YLDELOLW\ claim and not simply a GHVLUDELOLW\ 
claim, then it must be supposed that moral cosmopolitanism would literally leave large 
numbers of people unable to function. So it is claimed that people need a particular sense of 
national identity in order to be agents, and that a particular sense of national identity requires 
attachment to particular others perceived to have a similar identity. This argument seems 
plausible if it is assumed that cosmopolitanism requires the same attitudes towards all other 
human beings, but moderate cosmopolitanism does not make that assumption. Rather, the 
moderate cosmopolitan has to insist only that there is some favorable, motivating attitude 
toward all human beings as such; this leaves room for some special attitudes towards fellow-
citizens. Of course, the strict moral cosmopolitan will go further and will deny that fellow-
citizens deserve any special attitudes, and it might be thought that this denial is what flouts the 
limits of human psychology. But this does not seem to be true as an empirical generalization. 
The cosmopolitan does not need to deny that some people do happen to have the need for 
national allegiance, so long as it is true that not all people do; and insofar as some people do, 
the strict cosmopolitan will say that perhaps it does not need to be that way and that 
cosmopolitan education might lead to a different result. The historical record gives even the 
strict cosmopolitan some cause for cheer, as human psychology and the forms of political 
organization have proven to be quite plastic.  
In fact, some cosmopolitans have adopted a developmental psychology according to which 
patriotism is a step on the way to cosmopolitanism: as human individuals mature they develop 
ever wider loyalties and allegiances, starting with attachments to their caregivers and ending 
with allegiance to humanity at large. These different attachments are not necessarily in 
competition with each other. Just as little as loyalty to one’s family is generally seen as a 
problematic feature of citizens, so the argument goes, loyalty to one’s state is not a necessarily 
problematic feature in the eyes of cosmopolitans. Thus, cosmopolitanism is regarded as an 
extension of a developmental process that also includes the development of patriotism. This 
claim is just as much in need of empirical support, however, as the opposite claim discussed 
in the previous paragraph. 
Often, though, the critic’s arguments about psychological possibility are actually run together 
with GHVLUDELOLW\ claims. The critic says that the elimination of a special motivating 
attachment to fellow-citizens is not possible, but the critic means that the elimination of 
special motivating attachments to fellow-citizens will make a certain desirable form of 
political life impossible. To respond to this sort of argument, the cosmopolitan has two routes 
open. First, she can deny the claim itself. Perhaps the viability of politics as usual depends not 
upon certain beliefs that fellow-citizens deserve more of one’s service, but upon commitments 
to the polity itself. If strictly cosmopolitan patriotism is a possibility, it lives in a commitment 
to a universal set of principles embodied in a particular political constitution and a particular 
set of political institutions. If such commitment is enough for desirable politics, then the anti-
cosmopolitan is disarmed. But second, the cosmopolitan can of course also deny the value of 
the form of political life that is posited as desirable. At this point, moral commitments run 
over into a discussion of political theory. 
Occasionally it is said that cosmopolitans are treasonous or at least unreliable citizens. But 
many recognizably cosmopolitan theses (that is, the moderate ones) are consistent with 
loyalty to fellow-citizens, and even the strictest cosmopolitan can justify some forms of 
service to fellow-citizens when they are an optimal way to do good for human beings (who 
happen to be fellow-citizens, and not EHFDXVH they are fellow-citizens). 
This last criticism can be developed further, however, and tailored specifically to target the 
strict cosmopolitan. If the strict cosmopolitan can justify only some forms of service to 
fellow-citizens, under some conditions, it might be said that she is blind to other morally 
required forms or conditions of service to fellow-citizens. At this point, the critic offers 
reasons why a person has special obligations to compatriots, which are missed by the strict 
cosmopolitan. Many critics who introduce these reasons are themselves moderate 
cosmopolitans, wishing to demonstrate that there are special obligations to fellow-citizens in 
addition to general duties to the community of all human beings. But if these reasons are 
demanding enough, then there may be no room left for any community with all human beings, 
and so these objections to strict cosmopolitanism can also provide some impetus toward an 
anti-cosmopolitan stance. Because there are several such reasons that are frequently proposed, 
there are, in effect, several objections to the strictly cosmopolitan position, and they should be 
considered one-by-one. 
The first narrow objection to strict cosmopolitanism is that it neglects the obligations of 
reciprocity. According to this argument, we have obligations to give benefits in return for 
benefits received, and we receive benefits from our fellow-citizens. The best strictly 
cosmopolitan response to this argument will insist on a distinction between the state and 
fellow-citizens and will question exactly who provides which benefits and what is owed in 
return. On grounds of reciprocity the state may be owed certain things -- cooperative 
obedience -- and these things may in fact generally benefit fellow-citizens. But the state is not 
owed these things EHFDXVH one owes the fellow-citizens benefits. One does not appropriately 
signal gratitude for benefits received from the state by, say, giving more to local charities than 
to charities abroad because charity like this does not address the full agent responsible for the 
benefits one has received, and does not even seem to be the sort of thing that is commensurate 
with the benefits received. In assessing this exchange of arguments, there are some 
significantly difficult questions to answer concerning exactly how the receipt of benefits 
obliges one to make a return and concerning how the benefits one receives from one’s state 
affect the acceptability of emigration. 
A second objection to strict moral cosmopolitanism gives contractarian grounds for our 
obligations to fellow-citizens. Because actual agreements to prioritize fellow-citizens as 
beneficiaries are difficult to find, the contractarians generally rely upon an implicit agreement 
that expresses the interests or values of the fellow-citizens themselves. So the contractarian 
argument turns on identifying interests or values that obligate fellow-citizens to benefit each 
other. Perhaps, then, it will be argued that citizens have deep interests in what a successful 
civil society and state can offer them, and that these interests commit the citizens to an 
implicit agreement to benefit fellow-citizens. The strict cosmopolitan will reply to such an 
argument with skepticism about what is required for the civil society. Why is more than 
cooperative obedience required by our interests in what a successful state and civil society can 
provide? Surely some citizens have to dedicate themselves to working on behalf of this 
particular society, but why can they not do so on the grounds that this is the best way to 
benefit human beings as such? Perhaps an intermediate position here is the (Kantian) view 
that it is morally necessary to establish just democratic states and that just democratic states 
need some special commitment on the part of their citizens in order to function as 
democracies, a special commitment that goes beyond mere cooperative obedience but that can 
still be defended in universalist cosmopolitan terms. The acceptability of this type of view, 
however, will depend on whether one finds convincing the underlying Kantian political 
theory. 
The final argument for recognizing obligations to benefit fellow-citizens appeals to what 
David Miller has called ‘relational facts.’  Here the general thought is that certain relationships 
are constituted by reciprocal obligations: one cannot be a friend or a brother without having 
certain friendship-obligations or sibling-obligations, respectively. If fellow-citizenship is like 
these other relations, then we would seem to have special obligations to fellow-citizens. But 
this argument, which can be found in Cicero's 'H2IILFLLV, depends upon our intuitions that 
fellow-citizenship is like friendship or brotherhood and that friendship and brotherhood do 
come with special obligations, and both intuitions require more argument. Frequently, these 
arguments appeal to alleged facts about human nature or about human psychology, but these 
appeals generally raise still further questions. 
In sum, a range of interesting and difficult philosophical issues is raised by the disputes 
between cosmopolitans of various stripes and their critics. As the world becomes a smaller 
place through increased social, political, and economic contacts, these disputes and the issues 
they raise will only become more pressing. 
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